Studies in Philosophy and Education

Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence: An Internal Mechanism to Regulate the Emotions
--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:	SPED444R1
Full Title:	Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence: An Internal Mechanism to Regulate the Emotions
Article Type:	Manuscript
Keywords:	Deliberative democracy, emotions, citizens, capacities, deliberative school, education
Corresponding Author:	Martyn Griffin, PhD Durham University Durham, UNITED KINGDOM
Corresponding Author Secondary Information:	
Corresponding Author's Institution:	Durham University
Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution:	
First Author:	Martyn Griffin, PhD
First Author Secondary Information:	
All Authors:	Martyn Griffin, PhD
All Authors Secondary Information:	
Manuscript Region of Origin:	
Abstract:	Deliberative democracy, it is claimed, is essential for the legitimisation of public policy and law. It is built upon an assumption that citizens will be capable of constructing and defending reasons for their moral and political beliefs. However, critics of deliberative democracy suggest that citizens' emotions are not properly considered in this process and, if left unconsidered, present a serious problem for this political framework. In response to this, deliberative theorists have increasingly begun to incorporate the emotions in to their accounts. However, these accounts have tended to focus only upon the inclusion of emotions in the external-collective exchange of reason between citizens. Little work has been done on how the individual will actually cope with emotions internally within their own minds. There has been no consideration of the capacities that citizens will need to perceive, understand and regulate emotions as they formulate reasons both by themselves and with others. Moreover, there has been little consideration of how these capacities might be educated in children so that emotionally competent deliberative citizens can be created. In this paper, emotional intelligence is presented as an essential capacity that can fulfil this role for the deliberative citizen and deliberative democracy more generally. The 'deliberative school' is suggested as a potential site for this transformation that can progress from generation to generation, cultivating citizens that are increasingly better equipped to handle emotionally-laden deliberative engagement.
Response to Reviewers:	RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS Thank you for your comments on my article. I have taken time to be careful and thorough in my response and hope to have addressed each of them to your satisfaction. My response is integrated in to your comments with ***** before and after ****, suggesting what I have done and (if relevant) where in the article. The majority of my changes have taken place in the newly created fourth section (which replaced and extended upon my conclusion). The two main issues addressed in this section were outlining the link between education and democracy and also proposing more concrete examples of ways of developing emotional intelligence. In section three I also tried to be a little more positive about emotional intelligence as I had unintentionally allowed myself to over use words such as "tempering" and "regulating" which could be seen as

quite negative.

I hope the changes are sufficient to ensure it is ready for publication but if there are any further changes or suggestions I would be happy to consider them and develop it further.

Best wishes,

Martyn.

COMMENTS FOR THE AUTHOR:

Reviewer #1: "Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence: An Internal Mechanism to Regulate the Emotions" for the Studies in Philosophy and Education Journal

This paper has a very good potential to have an impact on current research (though it is difficult to assess to what extent), is interesting and worth publication. Some deficiencies need to be addressed, in my opinion, but I do not think that the revision will be too difficult for the author. This article can be published with minor changes.

1.   quality of writing (Is this paper well written and well structured? Is it accessible for a specialist audience? Is it accessible for a wider audience?)

The paper follows academic standards. I have no comments on the writing style and there are no stylistic changes to be made (except a lack of uniformity in spelling: recognise/recognize, while/whilst, towards/toward, in to/into, etc.). ***** I searched for any instances of these inconsistencies throughout the paper and made necessary changes. ****The analysis is consistent throughout the paper which is enjoyable to read. The author's clarity of vision allows him/her to focus upon elements of analysis and interpretation which, without his/her work, would have gone unnoticed by both the uninitiated and the expert. This impels the reader to rethink and nuance the uncompromising rationalist approach of familiar deliberative democrats, while avoiding the rehashing of thousands of pages already written about deliberative politics.

2. quality of argumentation (Is the argumentation sound? Are conclusions valid?)

Conclusions are based on initial premises, but I suggest that the author develops more clearly his/her conclusions and, in particular, their profound educational/instructional implications. ****These are developed further in the new section four. ****Moreover, I do not believe that Habermas rejects emotions in procedurally regulated deliberation, nor does he maintain the idea that citizens should individually become cold and passionless beings. Is it not deliberative procedure itself which makes possible and regulates the free exchange of arguments, rather than the will of superhuman citizens capable of putting aside their emotions and self-interests? ***** I have softened my critique of Habermas and Rawls slightly at the bottom of page three to account for this***.

3. educational focus (Does the paper focus sufficiently on educational issues?)

Educational theorists will nonetheless find themselves wanting should they expect to find within the pages of this paper (except some brief and general considerations, p. 18-19) an informative clarification concerning 'best teaching practices' to develop 'emotional intelligence'. For readers (who are not from UK), "Circle Time" or "Coalition Government's Free School/Academy System" should be briefly described. *****I added a fuller description of free school and circle time. *****Final recommendations from p. 18 to 20 are instructive, but given the length and detail of the discussion offered, they provide in the end few examples or concrete means used in schools to introduce the basis for such an education. So-called "active" methods have been recommended for over a century. Why then is deliberation in class still so seldom or so poorly practiced? Is such a self-doubt inducing practice in school typically emotionally costly? Can it provoke uncertainty relative to cognitions and emotions which form the basis of

students' ontological security and undermine this security, as well as the contexts from which it stems? Do we need risk-taking teachers trained for that? ******In the new (and extended) section four I have managed to integrate a few more concrete examples of the kind of educational changes that should be made. I think the section addresses education (and democratic education) much more thoroughly (especially given my word limit constraints) hopefully to the reviewer's satisfaction. ****

4. engagement with existing literature (Does the paper engage sufficiently with existing literature on the topic?)

Some philosophers insist upon the benefits of deliberation for amplifying empathy, for citizens encouraged to adopt the perspective of reciprocal concern (e.g. Benhabib, Goodin, Young). Other theorists limit themselves to identifying the formal conditions to be respected by a democratic regime, in order to insure that its decisions be based upon information and justification, that they be founded upon public arguments formulated by free and equal participants (e.g. Sunstein, Cohen). The author's discourse goes beyond this unproductive duality. It appears to me that the author has reviewed the literature that pertains to the topic - a number of scholars in education (conclusion), psychology (section three) and political theory (sections one and two) have been consulted. All well-known deliberative democrats are cited (except, surprisingly, Between Facts and Norms by Habermas) *****It was in the text, but oddly enough I hadn't put it in the bibliography. It is there now.**** and critically assessed from points of view which are not limited to political philosophy.

5. originality (Is this an original contribution to the discussion?)

The paper advances research (especially in section three and conclusion): I see new knowledge and scientific, philosophical or scholarly significance of the work.

6. significance (How significant is the contribution?)

I myself have conducted some research in deliberative democracy and democratic education, so I find the topic extremely interesting and important. As above-mentioned, however, the educational implications could have been brought out more clearly with a better appreciation of what teachers, students and curricula can do in relation to the topic discussed.

Other precisions and details:

References lack in uniformity. Among other examples: Journal of Social Philosophy. 37, (2), 301-313 ? Res Publica, 8:3, 249-268.

Habermas (1995 and 1984) does not appear in references.

In the text, first names are unnecessary (e.g. Chantal Mouffe, John Dryzek).

Page 7, first paragraph: there are two excerpts from Hall (2006) with no pages mentioned.

Page 14: "3.5." is unrequired next to Reflective Regulation of Emotion.

*****I have made these changes. ****

Reviewer #2:

1. quality of writing (Is this paper well written and well structured? Is it accessible for a specialist audience?; Is it accessible for a wider audience?)
This article is clearly written and well structured. It is easy to read and follows a logical structure. Key terms within deliberative democracy and emotional intelligence are well-defined enough to be accessible to those with less knowledge in these areas.

2. quality of argumentation (Is the argumentation sound? Are conclusions valid?)
I appreciate the author's argument for the need to consider how individuals process

emotion, which extends previous concerns (like those of Iris Marion Young) about the silencing of emotion and emotive speech in a productive direction. The argument is (in most cases) sufficiently grounded in the literature and makes sense.

3. educational focus (Does the paper focus sufficiently on educational issues?)
I found myself wanting to hear a bit more in the final section about teaching emotional intelligence. The author's suggestions for how to teach emotional intelligence are still quite broad and could be described in greater detail, including how such teaching could be linked to traditional school subject matter or used to otherwise fit in or compliment (or even challenge) the common practices in schools today.

****I feel that in section four I have made a much better job of outlining the educational implications. *****

4. engagement with existing literature (Does the paper engage sufficiently with existing literature on the topic?)
Overall, yes. Notably though the author refers to emotions with words and phrases that are far more negative than some of the scholars of emotion that he/she cites. For example, the use of descriptors like "limiting," "tempering," "regulating," and "controlling" suggest that emotion is just a negative thing to be reigned in, rather than a generative source of informed thinking, care for others, and the like, as some of the cited authors of emotional intelligence note. *****On reflection and reading it back I can see why the reviewer noticed this. I have reviewed section three and have removed certain words or at least supplemented them with positive instances of emotional intelligence, which is after all what I was trying to get across. *****In this way, the author's take on emotions seems to not be sufficiently reflective of the literature that is cited. I found myself getting frustrated by this throughout the article. I was also surprised not to see a discussion of Allison Jaggar's fine work on emotion, including its relation to good social thought and her discussion of how to determine which emotions are trustworthy?a skill that could be taught in schools. Here is a starting point: Allison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge," in Feminist Social
Thought, ed. Diana Tietjens Meyers (NY: Routledge, 1997). Going in a different direction (critical pedagogy), but still noteworthy in terms of the discussion of emotions, social exchange and critical thinking is Nicholas Burbules and Rupert Berk, "Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy," in Critical Theories in Education, eds. Thomas Popkewitz and Lynn Fendler (NY: Routledge, 1999). This article would be stronger if these perspectives were included. *****I decided to include a sentence about Jaggar's work on page 9 in relation to Krause but as I was closing in on 11 thousand words kept it brief. I appreciate the value of these authors though and thank the reviewer for bringing them to my attention. I have focussed mostly on authors from the deliberative tradition that address emotions and therefore have had to leave some other authors out. *****

5. originality (Is this an original contribution to the discussion?)
While concerns with emotion in deliberative democracy have been around for a while now, this article is sufficiently original in its effort to connect deliberative democracy to educating citizens for a specific type of emotional knowledge.

6. significance (How significant is the contribution?)
Good. I think this is a worthwhile paper to publish, though I would like to see some slight revisions to account for my concerns in #4 and #3 above.

reviewer #3
While this is a well-written, well-constructed, and well-argued paper, it is based on a premise whicih I find really problematic, both from an educational and a democratic point of view. The paper is based on the assumption that the relationship between education and democracy is an external and instrumental relationships, i.e., where the task of education is considered to be that of creating citizens with a certain 'qualities' (knowledge, skills, dispositions, etc.) and where it is assumed that this, in turn, will secure the quality of democracy. This is a very traditional way to think about the relationship between education and democracy (one could call it a psychological conception of democratic education, as it sees education as the process of preparing

the 'psyche' for democratic functioning) but it is not an uncontested approach. The author provides a particular 'version' of this way of thinking by putting forward emotional intelligence, but that does not alter the
underlying structure of the argument. What I find lacking in this paper is any awareness of the peculiarity of this particular connection between education and democratic politics - which also means that the author forgets to provide an argument for the particular connection. I am inclined to say that the author should at least engage with the arguments that have been given against this particular way of connecting education and democracy - in the UK for example by Biesta and Lawy in a number of papers (Cambridge Journal of Education; British Journal of Educational Studies - see also their empirical work in Citizenship, Education and Social Justice, and the British Educational Research Journal; Biesta's recent book 'Learning Democracy in School and Society' provides further arguments against the instrumentalist view of democratic education pursued by the author). I also think - and this can probably be done on the basis of an engagement with some of these arguments - that
the author should be more explicit about - and ideally provide a justification for - the particular conception of education s/he is using in his argument and his/her conception of democratic politics (one that seems to identify democracy with an idea of consensus rather than dissensus). If the author could add these dimensions to the discussion it would make the paper a little less naïve, particularly with regard to its expectations about education but also, in my view, with regard to the very particular notion of democracy that seems to inform the paper. I would recommend publication but with major revisions.***** I spent a significant amount of time trying to address this issue and have now incorporated it at the start of my newly devised section four. Hopefully this discussion is sufficient and provides a clear indication of where I stand on the issue. *****

Dr Martyn Griffin

Article Title

Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence- An Internal Mechanism to Regulate the Emotions

Work Contact

Durham University,
Durham Business School,
Mill Hill Lane,
Durham City
DH1 3LB,

Telephone Number- 0191 33 45201

Home Contact

1 Hillcrest,
Tow House, Bardon Mill
Hexham
Northumberland,
NE47 7EQ

Telephone Number- 01434 344934

*Manuscript
Click here to download Manuscript: Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence- revise a... ...to view linked References

1

Deliberative Democracy and Emotional Intelligence:

An Internal Mechanism to Regulate the Emotions

Introduction

In recent years deliberative democracy has come to acquire a position of great influence in political theory. The reasonable demand that citizens should be encouraged to put forward and defend their positions on political issues is one that has had increasing support (Bohman and Rehg 1998; Elster 1998; Fishkin and Laslett 2003). There has been a substantial shift from social contract models of democracy towards deliberative democracy (Weale 2004). Unsurprisingly, a wide range of criticisms of deliberative democracy have also been offered. One such set of criticisms have suggested that deliberative theorists have neglected the effect of emotions on the individual and collective reason giving process (Mouffe 2005; Young 1996). The critics argue that the passions of citizens will unavoidably affect the deliberative exchange of reasons and are, therefore, too important and central to the views and perspectives of citizens to ignore. Critics do disagree, however, on the extent to which these passions will undermine the deliberative process. Some suggest that although currently neglected the emotions can be integrated into a deliberative democratic account (Young 2000; Nussbaum 2006). Meanwhile, others suggest that a proper consideration of emotions, and their effect on the reason giving process, will show deliberative democracy to be an unrealistic aim and, in some respects, even a dangerous one (Mouffe 1999). Nevertheless, in each case, this critique of deliberative democracy has provided a strong challenge to those theorists defending and promoting it as a practical political framework.

In many respects, these criticisms directly contributed towards a re-evaluation of the role of emotions in the deliberative process. They led deliberative theorists to take emotions much more seriously and to think about how they might affect the exchange of reasons between citizens. Deliberative democrats, such as Dryzek (2002) and Gutmann (1996), have offered accounts of deliberative democracy that acknowledge, consider and incorporate the role of emotions. However, these newer accounts of emotion in deliberative democracy are not without problems of their own. Although they recognise that passionate arguments will affect the external-collective exchange of reasons *between* citizens, these theorists seem to neglect the other key aspect of emotions. They fail to address how the *individual* copes with these emotions internally, i.e., how they understand, interpret, translate and convert these emotions in their own internal-reflective deliberative process (Goodin 2003). In addition to this, the education required to cultivate these emotional capacities in citizens has not been adequately explored or addressed.

In this paper, the central role of emotions in the internal deliberations of citizens will be explored and a novel solution to their apparent neglect in deliberative democracy shall be proposed. The first section shall set the scene a little more broadly by briefly reviewing the philosophical literature on emotions in deliberative democracy. This will establish the extent to which the majority of previous theories fall short. In section two, however, some alternative deliberative accounts of emotion will be discussed. These were largely formed in response to criticisms discussed in the previous section and, despite making progress, it shall be argued that these accounts fail to integrate the emotions to the necessary extent. They pay too little attention to the capacities that citizens will need to learn, and be educated with, to understand, interpret and respond appropriately to emotions during deliberation.

In the third section, a new approach to dealing with emotions in deliberative democracy will be proposed- emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is an individual's 'ability to monitor one's own and others' emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one's thinking and action' (Mayer and Salovey 1993, 443). As of yet, this approach has not been discussed in a deliberative context and the role it could play for deliberative citizens has not been properly explored. In the concluding section, the role of emotional intelligence within democratic education shall be considered in a wider sense. An instrumental justification of the development of emotional capacities (and other skills and virtues) shall be provided that defends their cultivation as a means to uphold democratic institutions and to minimise domination of individuals and groups. Finally, several practical ways of incorporating emotional intelligence into the education of future deliberative citizens will be outlined. Emotional intelligence can never be a cure-all solution, and schools can educate it alone, but it can offer citizens a way of temporarily dealing with emotions and it can help them to deliberate more effectively about issues in society.

Section one- The Critique of Emotions in Deliberative Democracy

Plato was one of the earliest philosophers to suggest that emotions can, and will often, have a detrimental effect on the common man's deliberative thought processes. In *The Republic* these concerns led him to limit deliberation on political issues to the philosopher kings, those individuals who were naturally predisposed and, therefore, much more easily trained, to control their emotions. In a similar vein, later philosophers such as Kant (1785) also warned about the potentially immoral influence that emotions may have on the decision making process. This rationalist tradition has come to play a dominant role in modern political philosophy. It has also shaped the way that western liberal democratic legal and political institutions have been devised. The jury

system, for example, asks citizens to eliminate emotions from their deliberations in the belief that this will help them to reach a fair and just decision. Similarly, the founding fathers of American democracy were equally negative about the effect that emotions might have on the decisions of elected officials (Conlin 2009). Consequently, it was deemed necessary to limit democratic rights to certain individuals who were deemed less susceptible to the effects of emotion, while also limiting the overall influence that the public held over the makers of policy and law.

In more recent years, however, the demand for wider public participation on political issues has increased significantly. Deliberative theorists like Rawls and Habermas have challenged the dominance of purely representative models of democracy and in their own ways have defended the rights of *all* citizens to have a role in formulating the laws and policies that govern their lives (Rawls 1993; Habermas 1995). However, although both of these theorists defend greater public participation both remain concerned about the effects of emotion. They are fully aware of the negative effect that emotion might have on otherwise rational citizens and, therefore, locate themselves firmly within the Kantian rationalist tradition (Rawls 1999, 40-46; Habermas 1971, 1984). In other words, both of these theorists accepts that, in order to extend public participation successfully, *reason* rather than emotion must be used by individuals to justify the laws and policies of society (Krause 2005).

This is not to suggest that emotion and feeling have no role in these two seminal accounts, as they each appreciate the importance of citizens engaging with their passions. Krause (2008, 2) correctly argues that both of these theorists 'recognise[s] the importance of engaging citizens' attachments and desires as a means of fostering allegiance to the rational procedures of norm justification'. However, when citizens come to participate in these rational procedures, Rawls and Habermas seem to agree with Kant that emotion can undermine the impartiality and fairness of those involved. In each case, the role of emotion in the justification of moral norms is to be kept to a minimum (albeit never eliminated entirely) so that the deliberative procedure can regulate the free exchange of arguments and citizens can reason more productively together. As Krause suggests, 'even in accommodating affect [Rawls and Habermas] tend to subordinate it to forms of reason that aspire to be immune to the actual sentiments of real persons' (Krause 2008, 27). They may not idealise cold and passionless human beings but emotions are considered subordinate to reason and something to be kept in check, often by way of fair procedures and rules.

These two accounts of deliberative democracy have had a profound effect on the way that subsequent (and particularly the first wave of) deliberative democrats have understood the role of emotion in deliberation. Inspired by Rawls and Habermas, there has been a dominant understanding that emotion is potentially

dangerous to rational deliberation and therefore needs to be managed carefully or excluded entirely (Bohman 2005; Chambers 1996; Cohen 1989). John Elster, for instance, explicitly distinguishes the process of deliberation from emotion when he suggests that its main component, reason, must be 'impartial, both disinterested and *dispassionate*' (Elster 1998, 6).

However, critics of deliberative democracy have increasingly suggested that to separate emotion from reason in the justification of norms is not only misguided but perhaps impossible. For decades psychologists have highlighted empirical evidence which suggests that emotions will often undermine the cognitive consistency of individuals as they deliberate (Heider 1958; Festinger 1957). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse even suggest that 'real life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively…and can [therefore] lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place' (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 191). A number of political theorists have criticised deliberative democracy on these grounds. They suggest that the effects of emotion on the deliberative process are unavoidable and that to ignore or try to exclude emotion from a conception of democracy is not only misguided but potentially dangerous.

Two of the leading critics of the 'dispassionate rationalism' of deliberative democracy are Mouffe (1999) and Young (2001). Mouffe suggests that the mistake of deliberative democrats, and liberal political philosophy more generally, is to 'ignore the affective dimension mobilized by collective identifications and to imagine that those supposedly "archaic" passions are bound to disappear with the advance of individualism and the progress of rationalism' (Mouffe 2005, 7). The deliberative portrayal of the citizen, as someone who is capable of putting emotions to one side to rationally resolve conflict, is not only inaccurate but also potentially dangerous. Rather than resolving conflict, deliberative democracy often buries passionate disagreement leaving it to fester and eventually erupt in society

Mouffe suggests that democracy must, therefore, embrace the passions of the citizen and of 'the crowd' more generally. Her conception of democracy does not try to 'eliminate the passions nor relegate them to the private sphere in order to render rational consensus possible, but [instead tries] to mobilise these passions towards the promotion of democratic design' (Mouffe 1999, 756). The aim of democratic politics for Mouffe is to transform these passionate *antagonistic* relationships between enemies in to passionate *agonistic* relationships between adversaries (Ibid, 755). These 'adversaries do fight - even fiercely - but according to a shared set of rules and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are accepted as legitimate perspectives' (Mouffe 2005, 52). It seems, therefore, that Mouffe incorporates the passions into democratic politics but does so at the expense of any kind of deliberative engagement or deliberative learning by those involved. The views

which many citizens hold are irreconcilable and any suggestion that they might draw upon their capacities to temper their emotions and alter their views is downplayed. This seems to be a high and, perhaps, unnecessarily extreme price to pay for the inclusion of the emotions of citizens.

Young provides an alternative 'difference' critique of deliberative democracy. Young's account addresses the neglect of emotions while avoiding Mouffe's extreme conclusions. Like Mouffe, however, she agrees that 'the norms of deliberation privilege speech that is dispassionate and disembodied … [and that deliberative democrats] tend to falsely identify objectivity with calm and the absence of emotional capacities' (Young 2001, 120). But whereas Mouffe wants to embrace the confrontational and agonistic characteristics of citizens' emotions, Young believes that deliberative reason in its present form is already far too confrontational and agonistic. She suggests that 'by restricting their concept of democratic discussion to critical argument, most theorists of deliberative democracy assume a culturally biased conception of discussion that tends to silence or devalue some people or groups' (ibid 120). Consequently, rather than introducing any new exclusionary styles of interaction, Young proposes a *communicative democracy* wherein 'greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling are forms of communication that in addition to argument contribute to political discussion' (ibid 120).

Young's account of communicative democracy is clearly a less fundamental critique of deliberative democracy than Mouffe's agonistic account. Young finds a place for emotion and difference between citizens but does not do so at the expense of deliberation itself and, therefore, leaves open the possibility of deliberative learning and change. However, like Mouffe, Young adopts a relatively uncritical view of the role of emotions in politics. As Thompson and Hoggett suggest, 'while it is misleading to talk as if it were possible to exclude emotions from deliberative forums, it is unwise simply to include them without trying to understand their hazardous potential' (Thompson and Hoggett 2001, 353). While Rawls, Habermas and the rationalist tradition may have been unrealistic to ignore emotions, Young may be unduly optimistic about the role of emotions in deliberative politics. Young's focus on the emotions as a positive part of the external exchange of deliberative reason underplays the difficulties of interpreting, understanding and coping with the emotions. It also lacks an educational component to make the integration of emotions an easier and more practically achievable process.

Nevertheless, the criticisms offered by Young and Mouffe have had a significant impact on subsequent deliberative democrats. They have provoked a discussion and re-evaluation of the role of emotions in the deliberative process.

Section Two- Deliberative Democracy and the Reconsideration of Emotions

Dryzek (2002) is more accommodating to emotion in his deliberative account than are either Rawls or Habermas. He suggests that 'any formal or informal rules of debate that exclude emotional responses may be suppressing particular ways of making a point, and so making it less likely that the force of the point can be established' (Dryzek 2002, 53). However, despite defending the status of emotional arguments in the justification of moral norms, Dryzek's account also represents a lingering concern about the authority of emotions in the deliberative process. He warns that 'emotion can be coercive, which is why in the end it must answer to reason' (ibid 52-53). It is important to him that reason is still called upon as a distinct faculty to keep these potentially immoral and destructive emotions in check. Dryzek's separation of reason and emotion and his claim that reason should have the last word place him firmly within the Kantian tradition, a Kantian tradition that remains dominant within the deliberative literature.

However, there are problems with making such a sharp distinction between reason and emotion. There is little point in allowing emotional forms of speech like rhetoric and greeting, if they are going to be sharply distinguished from reason and treated as second-class forms of communication. The outcome of this kind of distinction will be just as undesirable as previous deliberative accounts as it will ultimately downplay emotions and fail to integrate them, and their educational development, in to the deliberative process.

Some deliberative democrats have rejected the Kantian distinction between emotion and reason. In its place they have embraced and incorporated an Aristotelian account of deliberation (O'Neill 2002; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Remer 2002). In these accounts emotion is not seen as an enemy of reason. That is, 'when men are angered they are not victims of some totally irrational force. Rather they are responding in accordance with the thought of unjust result. Their belief may be erroneous and their anger unreasonable but their behaviour is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is grounded upon a belief that may be criticised and even altered by argumentation' (Fortenbaugh 1977, 17). This Aristotelian perspective is most effectively incorporated in to the deliberative account of Gutmann and Thompson. In *Democracy and Disagreement*, Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 51) defend the use of impassioned speech and what they consider to be other 'non deliberative' forms of action, such as the public strike, in order to achieve deliberative ends. In doing so, they defend an instrumental understanding of passion as a *potentially* intelligent tool for the deliberative citizen.

However, Hall (2006) is sceptical about the extent to which Gutmann and Thompson satisfactorily incorporate emotion in to the deliberative process. She suggests that, even though they have 'implied that passion and reason can coexist, and perhaps even collaborate in the service of just ends…it is not at all clear

they have rejected a dichotomy between reason and passion, or the assumption that deliberation itself uses only the former' (Hall 2006, 11). In this respect, Gutmann and Thompson do offer an account of deliberative democracy in which emotions are included. However, their understanding of the role of emotions remains unsatisfactory because 'they continue to conceive of deliberation exclusively in terms of reason' (ibid). It is also notable that Gutmann and Thompson, like Mouffe and Young, focus on passion in a purely external sense, in the form of the passionate speech or public strike. They fail to pay attention to the role of emotions in the reflective process of individuals and they do not consider the capacities citizens will need in order to do so. As a consequence, despite Gutmann paying more attention to education than any of her counterparts, she tends to focus on the development of associational virtues and omits a consideration of how emotional capacities might be developed through appropriate education and learning (Gutmann 1988).

More recently, Krause has offered a deliberative theory that tries to overcome the dichotomy that persists between reason and emotion to provide a more integrated account. She too approaches the issue by explicitly rejecting the Kantian rationalist models endorsed by Rawls and Habermas (Krause 2008, 27-47). Instead, she chooses to align herself with David Hume, and his belief that 'reason is and ought only to be, the slave of the passions' (Hume 1739, 415). On Krause's account, deliberative citizens are motivated by passions and any attempt to abstract from this affective dimension in favour of purely rational engagement is not only unhelpful but practically impossible. In order to support this argument, Krause draws on the work of the neuroscientist, Damasio (1995; see also Hatzimoyaia 2009). Damasio found that individuals suffering from damage to areas of the brain regulating emotional response struggled with decision making skills (Damasio 1995, 32). This suggests that, contrary to the common assumption that emotion is the irrational enemy of reason, emotion is in fact a pre-requisite for rational decision making (Rolls 1999; Slovic et al 2002).

Krause took Damasio's findings and applied them to the assumptions made about citizens in deliberative democracy. She then attempted to demonstrate how a 'significant measure of impartiality [can be achieved] without sacrificing affective engagement' (Krause 2008, 77). In an effort to do so, Krause proposes the development of sympathy or moral sentiment in deliberative citizens. She suggests sympathy is extremely important because 'it facilitates the communication of sentiments and thereby enables us to enact responsibility for others in the sense most relevant for moral evaluation' (ibid 135). This, in turn, helps us to be impartial in the judgements and decisions that we make. However, Krause also recognises that sympathy can often be partial - it can be preserved for certain individuals or groups that are popular in society or those who agree with our interests and values. Therefore, in order to help citizens to be impartial in all of the decisions that they make,

sympathy must be supported by an ideal of equal respect and inclusiveness (ibid). This should encourage the deliberative citizen to consider the feelings and emotions of all people in society and with this to embrace new ideas and perspectives.

Krause's account is unusual in incorporating the emotions so extensively into the deliberative process. It moves beyond the dichotomy between reason and emotion, and even considers the capacities that citizens might need to utilise the emotions in a positive way. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Krause's account is without problems of its own. Three of these problems deserve particular attention and demonstrate the need for a more effective conception of emotional capacity and learning- an approach which is somewhat missing in deliberative democratic theory.

First, although sympathy is valuable to the deliberative citizen, it is questionable whether this concept really captures the scope of different skills that citizens will need. That is, although sympathy encourages citizens to recognise and understand the emotions of others it does very little to explain how these citizens might analyse, appraise, transform and express these emotions so that they become more intelligible and useful within the deliberative process. For example, it does not capture how we might more easily recognise bitterness in the actions of others. It does not explain how we might analyse these instances of bitterness and recognise other connecting emotions such as sadness or anger. Moreover, it does not explain how we might begin to transform the negative emotion of bitterness into a more positive feeling of hope. In this respect, sympathy can be quite limited in its application.

Second, although sympathy may help us to understand *other* citizens, it actually does very little to explain or describe how citizens might interpret and cope with their *own* emotions. For example, sympathy can play no role in helping us to recognise that our deliberative thought process is afflicted with constant feelings of resentment and hatred. Internally competent deliberative citizens should have the capacity to regulate their passions reflectively and to learn from them over time so that they can understand these emotions and can (to some extent at least) positively transform them.

Third, sympathy may be a useful capacity but it is not one that we can actively deploy to regulate other emotions. Typically we do not consciously choose to sympathise with another person's situation. It is as Hume argued a natural virtue, as opposed to an artificial one that we are taught (Hume 1751, 220). Sympathy is an emotion that often seems to be outside of our control – it is activated by our perception of a situation. It is, in this sense, too passive to regulate emotions. It is one emotion among others. This does not mean that it is without worth or that we cannot place children or adults in situations that might encourage the development of

their sympathies. It is right that we should be exposed to the emotions of different people through a variety of legal, social and political institutions, as well as art and literature. Krause suggests that this kind of 'exposure' will encourage citizens' sympathies towards each other, ultimately helping them to remain impartial in their deliberations (Krause 2008, 136-139). However, although it should have a role in an emotional account of deliberative democracy, sympathy is not active enough to help citizens thoroughly engage with and address the emotions which they possess and encounter in others. This requires a different concept altogether.

Krause's account does attempt to take seriously the central role of emotions in deliberation while also recognising the dangerous influence that emotions can have. However, she places too much weight on the role of sympathy – it cannot adequately fulfil the role that she attributes to it. Moreover, Krause does not recognise the importance of citizens understanding, appraising and transforming their emotions in a number of different positive ways. There is no consideration of the social construction of the passions and the fact that as Jaggar (1997, 165) suggests 'emotions are neither instinctive nor biologically determined' but are instead, taught through our cultures and, by extension, our schools. Although Krause makes progress in exploring emotion and its role in deliberative democracy, like other deliberative theorists, she fails to establish how citizens will regulate, and be taught to utilise, the emotions that they experience. Given the importance of the emotions in human deliberation, we must take seriously the many skills that citizens require to handle emotions when they are thinking about issues. In the third section, the potential application of emotional intelligence in this role shall now be considered.

Section Three- Emotional Intelligence and Deliberative Democracy

According to Damasio (1995, 13), 'what makes you and me "rational" is not suppressing our emotions, but tempering them in a positive way.' Individuals must, therefore, not avoid the emotions but embrace them so that they might be more accurately understood and, over time, transformed and utilised to their fullest extent. Pizzaro suggests that individuals are quite capable of achieving these goals. That is, we 'are able to effectively induce or suppress emotional reactions through a variety of tactics allowing us to recruit emotions when appropriate and lending flexibility to our emotional lives' (Pizzaro 2000, 358). This perspective is also supported by a growing literature that suggests that, whilst reasoning, citizens have the emotional intelligence to implement and positively regulate their feelings in a number of different ways (Gross 1999).

In many respects, this understanding of emotional regulation grew out of an older less developed concept, called *social* intelligence- an individual's 'ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and

girls - to act wisely in human relations' (Thorndike 1920, 229). However, it was not until the end of the twentieth century that the concept of social intelligence was rediscovered and used by Mayer and Salovey to understand the emotional component of human relations. They used the term 'emotional intelligence' to capture an individual's 'ability to monitor one's own and others' emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one's thinking and action' (Mayer and Salovey 1993, 433) Essentially, emotional intelligence is an awareness of our emotions and the emotions of others. It is not intended to eliminate emotions from political discourse entirely but it is a tool through which citizens can deliberate more effectively.

However, despite gaining popularity and being applied in a variety of different disciplines (Goleman 1995), the original work of Mayer and Salovey has not been considered in a deliberative democratic context. This is a serious omission as it has particular relevance to the issues discussed in the first two sections. Mayer and Salovey's discussion of emotional intelligence is extremely relevant when considering the intersection of reason and emotion in deliberative arenas and understanding how citizens can better cope with the pressures, the conflicts as well as the opportunities that it brings. It can act as a capacity which enables citizens to deliberate reasonably and rationally without the need to try and remove the effects of emotions. Mayer and Salovey identify four key features of emotional intelligence, which enable individuals to perceive, facilitate, understand and regulate emotion internally. These four features show how the regulation of emotion by citizens can ultimately help them to cope with emotions as they deliberate with each other and within themselves.

Perception, Appraisal and Expression of Emotions

Mayer and Salovey (1997) suggest that emotional intelligence has four specific branches and they outline them running from the least to the most psychologically complex. The first, and most basic, branch of emotional intelligence is the *perception, appraisal and expression of emotions*. This includes a number of other-directed aspects of emotional intelligence such as the ability to identify emotions in the faces of other people or through language and artwork (Mayer and Geyer 1996). These other-directed emotional capacities are likely to be essential for successful deliberation with others. If we do not recognise the emotions of other people during deliberation, we may misunderstand them and antagonize them unnecessarily. We may also miss opportunities to spot instances where people are trying to deceive us or even when they are reaching out to us for help and greater understanding. In addition to this, research suggests that the appraisal of our own emotions and feelings could not happen without appraisal of other people's emotions and vice versa - they are, therefore, highly interrelated (Hoffmann 1984).

There are a smaller number of *self-directed* aspects of the perception, appraisal and expression of emotion. They are no less important as they act as the building blocks of how we understand not only ourselves but other people as well. According to Mayer and Salovey, emotional capacities of this kind are the citizen's 'ability to identify emotion in one's physical states, feelings and thoughts' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 10). This is a capacity that children begin to learn very early in life when they start identifying their basic emotions like sadness, happiness and frustration. However, as their needs develop and their lives become more complex, so does the perception of a growing number of emotions. As adults therefore, this process becomes much more difficult and is often a stumbling block as people try to identify which emotions are affecting their own (and other citizens') deliberative thought processes and in what kinds of ways. This is an extremely important ability, therefore, because 'emotionally intelligent individuals can…respond more *appropriately* to their own feelings because of the accuracy with which they perceive them' (ibid, 9). It is here that a well-developed emotional intelligence can help citizens more accurately to identify the emotions that are positively and negatively influencing and shaping their thoughts about an issue. This, in turn, can help the deliberative process become more responsive to how people truly feel about issues while enabling them to express themselves fully in a supportive environment.

Perception of our own emotions is therefore the first step in the process of becoming an emotionally intelligent individual. It allows people to become more aware of themselves and, therefore, to begin utilizing their emotions as a power for good, helping them to formulate basic laws that might make more sense of their emotional states (Frijda 1988; Weiner 1985). For example, if we can identify how negative emotions like resentment and bitterness play a role in our thinking on a particular issue, it may provide an insight and an awareness that could help transform these emotions. It could help citizens to act more reasonably in deliberative arenas, not by eliminating these emotions altogether as some might suggest, but tempering and altering them so that they can inform our rational thought processes in more constructive ways. For example, perceiving and becoming aware of our internal resentment towards particular social groups might help us to avoid irrational bias and instead remain faithful to reason and the skills that it requires. Similarly, our emotional perception of a situation may be able to tell us something that our rational deductions may not be able to, leading us to adjust (or at least suspend) our conclusions about an issue.

This will not necessarily mean that we will overcome our differences with the individuals that we resent, or come to any kind of consensus. But it may mean that the disagreements we have with them can be approached more constructively and that different perspectives can be heard. If emotions like resentment and

bitterness go unidentified by the individual, as they often do, passionate or emotionally motivated disagreements (of the kind identified by the critics of rationalistic conceptions of deliberative democracy) will be much more likely to undermine deliberation. In other words, beliefs will be held dogmatically and opponents will not be given a fair hearing in deliberative arenas – in sum, minds will stay closed.

Emotional Facilitation of Thinking

Mayer and Salovey's second branch of emotional intelligence shows how we can use emotions to strengthen rather than weaken our capacity for internal deliberation. In fact, the '*emotional facilitation of thinking*', as they call it, can help citizens harness emotions in a number of different ways, allowing them to draw on the positive aspects and to minimize the negative effects of emotion (Mayer 1999). Firstly, rather than undermining the deliberative thought process, emotions, when utilised effectively, can direct attention toward important issues. For example, in *The Sentimental Citizen*, Marcus (2002) defends the emotional role of anxiety in the democratic process. Traditionally considered a negative emotion that undermines the deliberative thought process, Marcus suggests that on the contrary anxiety 'promotes immediate learning while at the same time it diminishes reliance on the previously learned' (Marcus 2002, 102). In this sense, it acts as 'an alerting system', gaining citizens' attention and ultimately facilitating their thinking (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). In other words, the emotionally intelligent citizen can actively perceive anxiety and direct it to focus their thinking on an issue that is troubling them. This is certainly preferable to the situation of the anxious citizen, who lacks emotional intelligence and, therefore, avoids addressing their anxieties, with the result that their anxieties cannot be properly and positively resolved.

Secondly, emotional intelligence can also be used to facilitate thinking by harnessing the power of positive emotions like enthusiasm, happiness and excitement. Properly regulated these emotions have all been shown to have a considerable facilitative effect on reasoning skills. Research shows, for example, that increased positive emotions lead to citizens who possess more flexible (Isen and Daubman 1984); creative (Isen, Daubman and Nowicki 1987); integrative (Isen, Rosenzweig and Young 1991); and efficient (Isen and Means 1983) cognitive thinking skills. Moreover, increased positive emotions have also been shown to support a number of deliberative virtues, such as increased confidence (Bandura 1986); tolerance (Kahn and Isen 1986); and an openness to new information and ideas (Estrada, Isen and Young, 1997). In other words, emotional intelligence can help to make the most of the passions that citizens experience so that positive emotions can be maintained, which, in turn, support the capacities which are essential for constructive and positive deliberation.

Thirdly, emotional intelligence can ensure that 'emotions are sufficiently vivid and available that they can be generated as aids to judgment and memory concerning feelings' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 12). For example, we can use these emotions to help us to decide which policies are most suitable in given situations. They can help us to remember how we previously felt in situations that approximate the expected implications of various policies or how we might feel in somebody else's position if certain policies are enacted. Mayer and Salovey talk about an 'emotional theatre of the mind' in which 'emotions may be generated, felt, manipulated and examined so as to be better understood' (ibid 13). This 'theatre method' can help citizen to imagine emotional states, recognise their significance and address them in specific ways that might alter our reasoning process. Ultimately, 'the more accurately and realistically such an emotional theatre operates, the more it can help the individual choose alternative life courses' (ibid 13). Rather than acting as a hindrance to impartial judgment, emotional intelligence can therefore help the citizen to use their minds more effectively in deliberative arenas so that they can consider their understanding of issues in a number of new and revealing ways.

Understanding and Analyzing Emotions

Mayer and Salovey's third branch of emotional intelligence is the ability to label emotions and determine connections between these different emotions. Many of these capacities address emotions in interpersonal relationships and are therefore other-directed. This includes, for example, the 'ability to interpret the meanings that emotions convey regarding relationships, such as that sadness often accompanies a loss' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 13). This aspect of emotional intelligence helps individuals to understand one another on a deeper level. Meanwhile, the self-directed elements of this branch are essential if we are to understand our own complex feelings and how to cope with them. In particular, Mayer and Salovey highlight the problem with 'blends' of emotions such as fear and desire or love and hate. These mixed emotions can often lead to the psychological discomfort that Festinger (1957) identified as cognitive dissonance. This occurs when the citizen holds two cognitions (including emotional feelings) that contradict or are inconsistent with each other. This leads to conflict within the citizen and, according to Festinger, can lead the citizen to reduce dissonance by burying one or both of these feelings and treating them as less important than they really are (ibid, 25-26).

However, not confronting but burying blends and mixtures of emotion in this way is not healthy for the deliberative process, both individually and collectively. It is what leads theorists like Rawls and Habermas to propose the rationalist accounts that they do. Burying emotional conflict does not help citizens to understand

why they feel this particular way or the implications of the conflict for them and their fellow citizens. It need not necessarily be resolved but the nature of the conflict should be discussed and understood more concretely on an external level for it to make sense. Without this, it will become increasingly possible that these buried and unresolved emotions will re-emerge sporadically and violently in the ways that Mouffe suggests. In this respect, it is the neglectful approach towards emotions, often concealed within a drive for consensus within deliberative arenas, that will lead to increased instances of antagonism in society and which will ultimately hinder the realisation of deeper deliberation and a more vibrant democracy.

It is therefore essential that emotional intelligence play a key role in helping citizens to analyze and understand the connections and relationships that exist between emotions. Once passions are understood and more easily recognised by citizens, emotional intelligence can then help them to 'recognise likely transitions between emotions so that they can work their way out of negative [or mixed] emotions' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 14). This can include, for example, a transition from anger to satisfaction, or from frustration to hope, obviously not on all occasions, as sometimes the continued presence of anger and frustration are highly appropriate, but it can help to lead the citizen away from cognitive dissonance in a much healthier way than merely burying or ignoring emotions. Ultimately, emotional intelligence can encourage citizens in deliberative arenas to understand both themselves and others more completely. It can therefore act as a tool by which citizens can challenge instances of injustice and domination in society, whilst ensuring that negative emotions do not undermine the best intentions of citizens to deliberatively consider the issues that they face as a community.

Reflective Regulation of Emotion

The final, and most psychologically complex, aspect of emotional intelligence concerns 'the conscious regulation of emotions to enhance emotional and intellectual growth' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 14). Many aspects of emotional regulation occur subconsciously rather than as a result of a choice that a citizen might make at any time. This is in many respects an unavoidable, and evolutionarily necessary, automatic process that serves to protect individuals and cut down on the amount of time and energy required to act. Nevertheless, there do also remain many instances where citizens can reflect on and consider the nature of their emotional states (Salovey, Hsee and Mayer 1993; Mayer and Stevens 1994). Not least in deliberative arenas. After all, even after we perceive and understand emotions, it is necessary to reflect upon these perceptions and understandings in order to ensure that we are deliberating in the most effective ways. It is in these particular instances therefore,

that Mayer and Salovey's concept of emotional intelligence can play a vital role for the citizen and the utilisation of their moods and feelings.

The reflective element of emotional intelligence operates, first and foremost, by enabling the citizen 'to stay open to feelings, both those that are pleasant and unpleasant' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 14). This capacity supports the deliberative thought process by ensuring that emotions support open-mindedness. For example, those ideas that evoke feelings of anger or disgust should not be discounted from our deliberative thoughts because they too might have a valuable contribution to make to reflective judgment. The reflective regulation of emotion allows the citizen to 'reflectively engage and detach from an emotion depending upon its judged informativeness or utility' (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 14). For example, emotional intelligence may enable somebody who associated their disgust with homosexual sex to detach from this emotion when considering the rights of gay people to adopt children. In doing so, the reflective element ensures that a variety of emotions do not stand in the way of the fair-mindedness, reasonableness and, perhaps above all, humility of citizens as they think about issues.

This ability to reflect on emotions enables all of us to monitor and become increasingly aware of how different emotional states affect us. It enables us to recognise for example, 'how clear, typical, influential or reasonable' our emotions are at any one time (Salovey and Mayer 1997, 14). In doing so, emotional intelligence can allow deliberative citizens to recognise when they are most susceptible and vulnerable to negative emotions. In circumstances where there is a particular chance of emotions leading them to unreasonable and atypical behavior therefore, they can more stringently draw upon skills and virtues that might work against these negative emotions. Alternatively, in circumstances where there is a chance that our emotions may have something to tell us that works against our current reasoning, it can have an equally profound effect on our deliberations. Consequently, this final reflective element also provides an opportunity for individuals to employ particular tactics that might decrease the negative, and increase the positive, influence of emotions on their deliberative thinking (Thayer, Newman and McClain 1994). Ultimately, this reflective element leads to adaptation and growth and improves the development of the beliefs and judgments of citizens as they think about issues and deliberate with each other.

Ultimately, these four key elements of emotional intelligence can play an important role in helping citizens to utilise the passions in the deliberative process. Emotional intelligence could provide a foundation by equipping citizens with the necessary capacities to approach passionate arguments that they encounter. It allows for the inclusion of the emotions in the deliberative process, by circumventing, or at the very least reducing, the

potentially negative effect that theorists like Rawls and Habermas were worried about. Emotional intelligence, in the four ways outlined above, can help citizens to gain greater insight in to the thoughts and feelings of others and themselves so that deliberation in society is more representative, responsive and reasonable in the widest sense possible. In doing so, it can support democratic institutions and help citizens to identify, understand and become more sensitive towards individuals and groups that are being oppressed and marginalised in society. Ultimately, as one of the many deliberative capacities that citizens could potentially be equipped with, it could, if educated effectively, act as a force for good and add to the vibrancy and deliberative nature of the democratic system.

Section Four-- Educating the Emotionally Intelligent Deliberative Citizen

Even if we have a concept like emotional intelligence available that might improve citizens' capacities, at least two important issues remain. First, how might a democratic society promote such an ideal within its citizens? Should they (and can they legitimately) even try to do so at all? Second, even if we can legitimately do so, how might educationalists practically teach emotional intelligence within schools? Is it even possible? In this concluding section these two issues will now be considered.

The roots of the modern educational system and what we now call 'traditional schooling' can be found in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when enlightenment ideals began to shape the development of an education system for *all* children in society. To such an extent, in fact, that according to Giroux (2001, 3) much of modern schooling is still 'firmly entrenched in the logic of technocratic rationality and has been anchored in a discourse that finds it's quintessential expression in an attempt to find universal principles of education that are rooted in the ethos of instrumentalism and self-serving individualism.' These ideas were popularised throughout the nineteenth century as a way of transmitting particular values and of producing a capable, competent and, above all, a compliant workforce. Even today, however, it is common for academics and politicians to ask how we might organise our educational system so that we can produce citizens with particular qualities, skills and virtues- a certain type of democratic citizen. In many respects, that is exactly what is being offered within this paper. The development of emotional capacities is seen as an important step towards improving individuals and improving democracy and society at large.

Recently, however, some educationalists have begun to express concerns about the instrumental application of education in this way (Biesta 2007, 2011; Biesta and Lawy 2006). Biesta highlights three concerns, in particular, that should be addressed. First, he suggests that the instrumentalist approach unfairly

burdens schools with the task of producing democratic citizens. It is 'unrealistic to assume that schools can "make or break" democracy' (Biesta 2007, 741). This is, in part, correct. It would be wrong to suggest that schools can develop emotionally intelligent, democratic citizens all by themselves. Nevertheless, it would be equally wrong to suggest that they do not have an integral role in shaping the minds of future citizens. Although families, youth clubs, churches, sports clubs and other institutions will play significant roles in civil society, schools are the only site that *all* children attend and are the only direct opportunity for the state to have a legitimate influence over the skills and virtues that children will develop. This is unlikely to be a "make or break" scenario in the immediate term, of course, but from generation to generation it would be odd to think that a nation's educational system could not have a large role in promoting and sustaining a vibrant democracy which, in turn, acts as the most effective safeguard of people's freedoms.

Second, Biesta (2007, 741) suggests that the instrumental approach is individualistic in regard to education and is 'focused on equipping individuals with the proper set of democratic knowledge, skills and dispositions, without asking questions about individuals' relationships with others and about the social and political context in which they learn and act.' To take such a one-sided approach would, of course, be misguided. But there is no reason why developing individual capacities towards an instrumental goal (improved democracy, protection of basic liberties) cannot be thought of as a central part of (and reason for) educating children in groups. In fact, following Vygotsky (1978), it would be sensible to adopt a strategy wherein peer mediation and group learning was a central part of developing and maximising the potential of individuals, particularly in an area like emotional intelligence where group interaction often stimulates emotional response to a greater degree. I shall address in a little more detail below. It is important not to lose sight, however, that every child has a unique set of needs and circumstances that necessitate an individualised component to their education.

Third, Biesta (2001, 741) argues that the instrumental approach is individualistic in regard to democracy. It is 'assumed that the success of democracy depends on the knowledge, skills, and dispositions of individuals and on their willingness as individuals to act democratically.' The problem here, according to Biesta, is that this relies too heavily upon common identity and sameness rather than the difference and plurality that exist in modern democratic societies (cf. Young 1996). He goes on to present an Arendtian alternative in which an intrinsic valuation of democracy and education is defended that does not focus upon individuals and does not, therefore, treat them as a means to an end. In this situation '(w)hat schools can do- or at least try to do- is to make democratic action possible. This involves creating conditions for children and students to be subjects and

to experience what it means to be a subject' (2007, 740). The development of capacities like emotional intelligence would emerge much more organically, in the course of interaction as children experience new ideas and perspectives in an educational setting.

There are three problems here which when briefly outlined, summarise my own position. First, although commonality and sameness may exist in some instrumental accounts of democratic education, perhaps even the majority, the kind of commonality presented in my own account is quite minimalistic. Citizens may be equipped with similar emotional capacities (and other skills and virtues that are by no mean delimited) but these are being developed for the very purpose of enabling self-development. They encourage critical thought and sustain the kind of autonomy necessary for the kind of different opinions and perspectives that fuel a vibrant and free democracy. There is no allegiance to a Habermasian consensus-driven conception of deliberative theory within my account that would work beyond these capacities encouraging agreement on all manner of issues. In fact, a republican contestational model of deliberative democracy of the kind proposed by Pettit (1997) and Maynor (2003) would be much more consistent with my approach. Capacities like emotional intelligence would help citizens to provide testimony and to debate issues much more thoroughly (often without agreement) but with the very purpose of challenging injustice and upholding democratic institutions.

Second, nevertheless Biesta does seem to underestimate the need for a shared *collective* goal in a pluralistic democracy. After all, why should parents accept that schools should be organised in the way that Biesta and Arendt describe? They each characterise an intrinsic value of a way of living, and of flourishing, that other sections of society may not agree with. In short, despite the attraction of their approaches, there needs to be a stronger, instrumental justification to supplement this intrinsic valuation of democratic education. Without this, it is difficult to establish grounds on which the state can justifiably organise educational institutions in a particular way. For me, and many other republican deliberative democrats, this justificatory basis is the sustainment of free institutions and the minimisation of political domination in society.

Third, this ultimately means that proactively developing capacities like emotional intelligence is a necessary (but not sufficient) component of a free democratic society. Nurturing deliberative capacities in this way may, in fact, be the most effective means of ensuring that difference and plurality can be sustained. An alternative method in which we reduce an emphasis on our shared goals and leave too much up to an organic, free developmental system wherein the nature of subjectivity is left entirely open and undefined, and able to be shaped at it's foundations by elements within civil society that are anti-democratic or unreflective may do more harm than good. In summary, the instrumentalist approach being defended here is quite different from the one of

traditional schooling, which according to Freire (1973, 68) 'anaesthetizes and inhibits creative power'. It is also quite different to the overly individualistic position that Biesta quite rightly criticises. The instrumentalist position I adopt here justifies the development of emotional intelligence (and other capacities) for the sustainment of free institutions that provide a free public sphere in which individuals and groups can then invent and reinvent themselves with these tools.

The final issue I wish to address in this paper is how educationalists might practically nurture emotional intelligence within citizens. Not as a process that can create emotional geniuses who rarely lose their tempers and who can always perceive emotions accurately. But which can from generation-to-generation create citizens who are better suited to deliberative participation. This type of education is, in general terms, one that is entirely opposed to the form of technocratic instrumentalism defended within traditional schooling, where the transmission of information between teacher and student is paramount. This is what Freire (1973, 209) calls the banking concept of education, where 'the teacher knows everything and the student knows nothing…the teacher thinks and the student is thought about…the teacher talks and the students listen meekly.' This approach to education is unlikely to create the kinds of emotionally intelligent and deliberative citizens I have been describing. As Dewey (1910, 52) rightly identifies, it privileges information over wisdom, applying mechanical efforts to cover a syllabus and train towards standardised tests, rather than nurturing the mind of the child and the *tools* they use to think. In many respects a new approach to education is the central element in translating the deliberative ideal in to deliberative practice, and of narrowing the gap between the citizens that we have and the citizens we would like to have (Lefrancois and Ethier 2010).

Nevertheless, when it comes to emotional intelligence education is by no means a straightforward solution. In 2000 Mayer and Cobb raised significant doubts regarding the possibility of educating this capacity and questioned whether it could be in its current form. The fear, at the time, was that emotional intelligence had been hijacked by pseudo-scientific forces and had subsequently been mistranslated by educational practitioners without proper evidence of its successful application (Mayer and Cobb 2000, 163-164). However, since this time there have been further studies in to socio-emotional learning which begin to show positive signs about the development of emotional capacities in young children and the benefits it can bring. Before discussing some of these, however, there are also several further small but significant criticisms of the education of emotional intelligence that should be addressed briefly.

Schools have traditionally been quite poor at nurturing children's emotional capacities (Benson 2006). It is also clear that schools cannot teach children *everything*. They have neither the resources nor the time to do

so. A radical reorganisation will therefore be necessary in order to deliver a simple but effective approach to education that neither asks too much of children or teachers but delivers (on an increasingly consistent basis) emotional competent citizens. There have also been fears that emotional intelligence is acting as a catch-all concept that can solve all the problems of educating children in society (Mayer and Cobb 2000, 170). It is important to recognise, therefore, that emotional intelligence is one of many intelligences (Gardner 2006), and one of many capacities that citizens need. As critics have pointed out, emotional intelligence by itself will not always improve behaviour (Zeidner, Roberts and Matthews 2002), and it will not always contribute towards good citizenship (Qualter, Gardner and Whitely 2007, 17). For example, without educating the proper motivational virtues, citizens will not necessarily apply their emotional intelligence in the pursuit of deliberative ends. Moreover, without the proper cognitive skills they will not be able to use the feelings that they perceive and connect them to reasons and logical arguments. These capacities must be educated alongside one another therefore, if they are to have the full effect. However, this wider task, of integrating the capacities required for deliberative participation, has rarely been considered. It is an essential task that must be performed elsewhere. The purpose of this article, however, is much narrower. To show how central emotional intelligence is as a *component* of this process.

Unfortunately, like many other people, political theorists have tended to see education, and by extension the education of emotional intelligence, as either an unimportant task or a task for others to pursue. Sections one and two both displayed examples of deliberative theorists who while valuing deliberative engagement (the latter group involving emotions to a large degree), still failing to take education in to account to make this process a much more realisable prospect. In the rare cases when education has been considered by deliberative theorists, the education of emotions has received little or no attention at all, leaving it poorly explored. With this in mind, it is important to begin any account of the education of emotional intelligence by characterising it not as a 'soft woolly option', but as a 'hard-nosed, rational strategy' to improve the way that children talk to their peers and their teachers as well as how they think about issues more generally (Weare and Gray 2003, 62). Given the positive role it can potentially play for citizens (as argued in section three), its successful education in the minds of future citizens therefore has huge implications for political decision making and on the potential viability of deliberative models of government.

In order to translate this in to practice, however, there are three general or 'golden' rules that should be adhered to within what shall be called the 'deliberative school'. First, the education of emotional capacities is not a task for a single lesson, set aside for the child each week. Instead, emotional intelligence must be

incorporated into the curriculum, code of conduct and the whole ethos of the school so that it becomes something which is celebrated and cherished in a much wider sense. Empirical investigations in to best-practice for social and emotional learning have stressed the importance of what they refer to as a 'whole school approach' (Durlak et al 2011 407; Weare and Gay 2003, 72). This means that emotional intelligence (and other important aspects) are incorporated into the whole curriculum, staff development, pupil support, as well as the school's connection to and activities with the wider community. In many respects, the school becomes a microcosm, or from a deliberative perspective a child-centric deliberative community, that is able to nurture emotional intelligence by promoting emotional learning and responsiveness.

Second, emotional intelligence should be developed as early as possible to be most effective in the creation of deliberative citizens. It has been shown that as children grow older, it becomes less likely that emotional (and related social) problems and deficiencies can be addressed (McGinnis 1990). Individual behaviours and intelligences become more entrenched so that propensity to improve the capacity to understand, analyse, evaluate and transform emotions effectively becomes much less possible. By extension, the implicit belief of many deliberative theorists, that citizens will simply learn the necessary capacities as adults within deliberative arenas, seems to be profoundly optimistic and misguided. Without interventions at the earliest years it seems much more likely that we will create citizens who are deficient in emotional capacities and much less likely that we will develop citizens who can deliberate effectively.

Third, even though early-years education is essential, it is also important to not lose sight of this as a long-term developmental process to create, amongst other things, emotional intelligent deliberative citizens. As Weare and Gay (2003, 53) suggest, 'there is clear evidence that programmes that aim to develop emotional and social competences are more effective the longer they are in place, and most take years really to establish.' This reiterates the point, that, like deliberative democracy itself, developing emotional intelligence is no quick-fix. It is a seed that must be planted years, and perhaps decades, before a generational shift is established and an emotionally responsive deliberative citizenry is secured. It must be nurtured through pre-school, primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions as well as the wider deliberative culture, to ensure that development is continuous and effective.

As well as these general characteristics of the deliberative school, more specific techniques should also be applied within these schools to nurture emotional intelligence. Four of these, in particular, have relevance in a deliberative democratic context. First, it has been claimed that greater participation and active learning is correlated with higher levels of emotional intelligence (Scott-Ladd and Chan 2004). Therefore, in order to

increase emotional sensitivity, it is important that educational institutions increasingly incorporate opportunities for children to debate with each other, vote on different matters, and actively engage with ideas and knowledge in a way that adult deliberators might. It could be suggested that 'active' learning has been promoted increasingly over the past century and yet levels of deliberation are still relatively poor within society. However, despite an emphasis on 'active' education, there has rarely been a clear indication and consistent vision that the purpose of educational institutions is to teach children *how* to think rather than *what* to think. Democratic education and the development of the skills and virtues of the mind have only ever been an after thought rather than the main priority. In order for this to change, it is necessary to break free from the shackles of traditional schooling and replace it with a form of 'active' learning that has a clear goal of enabling critical and reflective deliberative citizens.

Second, autonomy is, in a very similar way, essential for the development of an environment where emotionally competent children can flourish. Not only in respecting the autonomy of children to have some control over their education (Piaget 1952; Little 1982), but also in respecting the autonomy of schools and teachers to lead this process (Moos 1991). Schools and teachers would have to work within the minimalist boundaries set out above but this would still provide huge scope, thereafter, to design curricula and classroom lessons around cultivating emotional intelligence and other important skills and virtues. This will also require teachers to be trained in a different way so that they can fully appreciate the main purpose of the deliberative school and take full advantage of and utilise the autonomy they have been given. It will require them to take greater risks in the classroom and to be much more proactive and imaginative in the type of education that they provide. High quality individuals should also be recruited and attracted to the profession that may otherwise be attracted elsewhere, either due to salaries or simply because the role of the teacher is not celebrated enough within our culture. The kind of changes expressed within this article may (in part) help to achieve this, so that teachers felt that they were trusted and an essential part of creating future citizens.

Third, it has also been shown that students learn about their emotions and, by extension improve their emotional intelligence, through older peers and mentors (Qualter et al 2007, 92). In this respect, although autonomy should be highly valued in the deliberative school, there is also a requirement for older children and adults to help less developed individuals to improve their emotional intelligence over time. The role of mediation in this process should also be regarded highly, therefore, as it helps to direct learning and nurture skills in a way that laissez-faire approaches to development do not (Vygotsky 1978). It enables older peers and adults to reinforce their skills through action, and in doing so encouraging the development of new skills in

younger children. To provide more specific example of an educational innovation that could supplement this, it may also be possible to stop thinking about strictly defined year groups. Instead, it may be more sensible for children to be at different levels depending on their ability in different subjects. This would give the added bonus of maximising potential but also (by selecting appropriate learning partners) nurturing emotional intelligence by being around older and more mature students.

Fourth, in a similar vein, the importance of 'group work' in the deliberative school has been shown to be essential for developing emotional competence and learning (Weare and Gay 2003, 70; Marchant 1995). It is in such environments that participation, active learning and mediatory relationships can flourish and which, therefore, provide the most encouraging situation for the development of emotionally intelligent children. In order to show how serious the deliberative school was about group learning, it would be necessary to extend assessment beyond the individual to gauge how well children work with others, their collaborative skills and, of course, how they deal with emotions during this process. This would not mean extending upon an already overly large examination period but would mean a more equal appreciation of the fact that possessing the emotional intelligence (skills and virtues) to works in groups are just as essential for success in the wider world (and wider democracy) than individual excellence. Another way of nurturing this idea of group work within the deliberative school would be to elevate the role of competitive team sports, theatre groups, choirs and other group activities which can be essential channels through which some children are most effectively developed.

A deliberative school, following these general rules and employing these (and many other) techniques would, over time, create citizens with higher levels of emotional intelligence and provide a much stronger foundation for deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, two final concessionary points should also be made. First, in many of the areas outlined above, progress is already being made in UK schools to teach social and emotional learning and to improve emotional intelligence. However, despite programs like *Circle Time*- a group activity devoted towards children listening, exchanging ideas and reflecting about thoughts and feelings- attempts at social and emotional learning remain a somewhat separate entity from the 'core curriculum'. Moreover, the deliberative school which is defended in this paper differs to the extent that it has a clear vision of what we are preparing children for. It is not a laissez-faire educational approach that provides environments for emotional enrichment so that it might improve individual academic achievement alone. It has a further, and larger, purpose to nurture emotional intelligence and improve the likelihood of successful and effective democratic participation and involvement in a deliberative political community that, in turn, improves the collective culture and society, and enriches the lives of most individuals in doing so.

Second, it should said that despite the educationalists making considerable progress in showing how effective emotional learning can be if applied in schools, further research is still required to fully demonstrate the potential of this concept. In particular, further longitudinal studies are required in order to fully assuage Mayer and Cobb's doubts about teaching and improving emotional intelligence over a number of years. Moreover, when incorporating deliberative democracy into the picture, there is now another variable which empirical investigations would be equally helpful. If children could take part in 'deliberative events' within schools over a number of years, and emotional intelligence (and other factors) could be tracked to determine change, in relation to control schools, then this may teach us even more about the interrelation between participation, emotional intelligence and education. Whereas in the past, experimentation of this kind would have seemed much less likely and less practically possible, despite having many shortcomings the Coalition government's Free school/Academy system (which allows parents to set up schools free from local authority interference) may, in fact, provide an ideal opportunity to trial such whole school deliberative approaches. Just as likely, however, it will lead to many more schools which have curricula and environments that are even less concerned with the development of emotionally intelligent deliberative citizens.

In an even more general sense, though, it is also important that further research is done in to how the wider motivational virtues and skills of young children interrelate with emotional intelligence, and how a much broader account of a deliberative education can be secured. Without developments of this kind, then the deliberative project is much less likely to incorporate an educational approach and, as a result, much less likely to come to fruition.

Acknowledgments

References

- Bandura, A. (1986) *Social Foundations of Thought s and Action,* New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Benson, P.L. (2006) *All kids are our kids: What communities must do to raise caring and responsible children and adolescents (2nd Edition)*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

- Biesta, G.J.J. (2007) 'Education and the Democratic Person: Towards a Political Conception of Democratic Education', *Teacher's College Record*, 109 (3), 740-769.

- Biesta, G.J.J. (2011) *Learning Democracy in School and Society: Education, Life Long Learning and the Politics of Citizenship*, Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

- Biesta, G.J.J. and Lawy, R.S. (2006) 'From teaching citizenship to learning democracy: Overcoming individualism in research, policy and practice', *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 36 (1), 63-79.

- Bohman, J. (2005) 'Democracy and Cultural Pluralism' *Political Theory,* 23, 2, 253-79.

- Chambers, S. (1996) *Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse*, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 17-34.

- Cohen, J. (1989) 'Deliberative and Democratic Legitimacy' in Hamlin, A. and P. Petit (Eds.) *The Good Polity,* Blackwell: New York.

- Conlin, J. (2009) *The American Past: A Survey of American History,* Boston: Wadsworth.

- Damasio, A. (1995) *Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, New York: Avon.

- Dryzek, J. (Ed) (2000) *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond,* New York: Oxford University Press.

- Durlak, J.A., Weissberg, R.P., Dymnicki, A.B., Taylor, R.D. and Schellinger, K.B. (2011) 'The Impact of Enhancing Students' Social and Emotional Learning: A Meta-Analysis of School-Based Universal Interventions', *Child Development*, January/February, 405-432.

- Elster, J. (Ed.) (1998) *Deliberative Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Estrada, C. Isen, A. and Young, M. (1997) "Positive Affect Facilitates Integration of Information and Decreases Anchoring in Reasoning Among Physicians" *Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Procedures*, 72, 117-135.

- Festinger, L. (1957) *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,* California: Stanford University Press.

- Fortenbaugh, W. (1977) *Aristotle on Emotion*, London : Duckworth.

- Fishkin, J. and Laslett, P. (2003) *Debating Deliberative Democracy,* Oxford: Blackwell.

- Frijda., F. (1988) 'The Laws of Emotion' *American Psychologist*, 43, 349-358.

- Freire, P. (1973) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, London: Penguin.

- Goleman, D. (1995)*Emotional Intelligence,* New York: Bantam Books.

- Gross, J. (1999) "The Emerging Field of Emotion Regulation: An Integrative Review" *Review of General Psychology*, Volume 2, 271-299.

- Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (1996) *Democracy and Disagreemen*t, Massachusetts: Belknapp.

- Habermas, J. (1971) *Toward a Rational Society*, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.

- Habermas, J. (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action*: *Volume 1*, Boston: Beacon Press.

- Habermas, J. (1995) *Between Facts and Norms*, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

- Hall, C. (2006) "Deliberative Democracy and the Public Use of Passion," 9a-10. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150587_index.html, accessed on 4/12/09.

- Hatzimoysis, A. (2009) *Philosophy and the Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Heider, F. (1958) *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations,* New York: Penguin.

- Hibbing, J. and Theiss-Morse, E. (2002) *Stealth Democracy: Americans Beliefs about How Government Should Work*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hume, D. (1739) *A Treatise of Human Natur*e.

- Hume, D. (1751) *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*.

- Isen, A. & Daubman, K. (1984) "The influence of affect on categorization" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 47, 1206-1217.

- Isen, A. Daubman K. and Nowicki, G. (1987) "Positive Effect Facilitates Problem Solving" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 1122-1131.

- Isen, A. and Means, B. (1983) "The Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making Strategy" *Social Cognition*, 2, 18-31.

- Isen, A. Rosenzweig, A. and Young, M. (1991) "The Influence of Positive Affect on Clinical Problem Solving" *Moral Decision Making*, 11, 221-227.

- Jaggar, A. (1989) 'Love and Knowledge : Emotion in Feminist Epistemology', *Inquiry*, 32 (2), 151-176.

- Kahn, B. and Isen, A. (1993) "The Influence of Positive Effect on Variety Seeking Among Safe Enjoyable Products" *Journal of Consumer Research*, 20, 257-270.

- Kant, I. (1785) *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*.

- Krause, S. (2005) "Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justification in Rawls and Habermas," *Contemporary Political Theory*, 4, 363-85.

- Krause, S. (2008) *Civil Passions*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

- Lafrancois, D. And Ethier, M-A. (2010) 'Translating the Ideal of Deliberative Democracy in to Democratic Education: Pure Utopia?" *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 42 (3), 271-292.

- Little, R. (1982) 'Norms of collegiality and experimentation: workplace conditions of school success'. *American Educational Research*, 78, 178-185.

- Marchant, S. (1995) 'The essential curriculum for pupils exhibiting emotional and behaviour difficulties' *Therapeutic Care and Education*, 4, 36-47.

- Marcus, G.E. and Mackuen, M. (1993) "Anxiety, Enthusiasm and the Vote: Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns" *American Political Science Review*, 87 (3), 688-801.

- Marcus, G.E. (2002) *The Sentimental Citizen*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

- Mayer, J. (1999) "Personality and the search for success [Book review of Seymour Epstein's Constructive Thinking: The Key to Emotional Intelligence]' *Contemporary Psychology: The APA Review of Books*, 44, 467-470.

- Mayer, J. and Cobb, C.D. (2000) "Educational Policy on Emotional Intelligence: Does it make sense?" Educational Psychology Review, 12 (2), 163-183.

- Mayer, J. and Salovey, P. (1993) "The Intelligence of Emotional Intelligence" *Intelligence,*17, 433-442.

- Mayer, J. D. Salovey, P. (1997) 'What is emotional intelligence?' In P Salovey & D. Sluyter (Eds) *Emotional Development an Emotional Intelligence: Implications for Educators* (pp. 3-31). New York: Basic Books.

- Mayer, J. D., & Stevens, A. (1994) 'An emerging understanding of the reflective (meta-) experience of mood' *Journal of Research in Personality*, 28, 351-373 New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

- Maynor, J. (2003) *Republicanism in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

- McGinnis, E. (1990) *Skillstreaming in Early Childhood: Teaching Prosocial Skills to the Preschool and Kindergarten Child*. Champaign, Illinois: Research Press.

- Moos, R. (1991) 'Connections between school, work and family settings. In B. Fraser and H, Walberg (eds) *Educational Environments*. Oxford: Pergamon.

- Mouffe, C. (1999) "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism" *Social Research*, 66 (3), 745-58

- Mouffe, C. (2008) *On the Political*, London: Routledge.

- Nussbaum. M. (2006) "Political Soul-Making and the Imminent Demise of Liberal Education." *Journal of Social Philosophy*. 37, (2), 301-313.

- O'Neill, J. (2002) "The Rhetoric of Deliberation: Some Problems in Kantian Theories of Deliberative Democracy" *Res Publica*, 8 (3), 249-268.

- Pettit, P. (1997) *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Piaget, J. (1952). *The Origins of Intelligence in Children.* New York: International University Press.

- Pizzaro, D. (2000) "Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgment" *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 30 (4), 355-375.

- Qualter, P., Gardner, K.J. and Whitely (2007) 'Emotional Intelligence: Review of Research and Educational Implications', *Pastoral Care in Education*, March 2007, 11-20.

- Rawls, J. (1993) *Political Liberalism,* New York: Columbia.

- Rawls, J. (1999) *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, Massachusetts: Belknapp Press.

- Remer, G. (2002) "Two Models of Deliberation: Oratory and Conversation in Ratifying the Constitution" *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8 (1), 68-90.

- Rolls, E. (1999) *The Brain and Emotion,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Salovey, P. Hsee, C. & Mayer, J. (1993) "Emotional intelligence and the self- regulation of affect' in D.M. Wegner & J.W. Pennebaker (Eds.) *Handbook of Mental Control,* New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 258-277.

- Scott-Ladd, B. and Chan, C. (2004) 'Emotional Intelligence and Participation in Decision Making: Strategies for Promoting Organizational Learning and Change' *Strategic Change*, 13, 95-104.

- Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E. and Macgregor, D. (2002) "The Affect Heuristic" in T. Gilovich, D. Griffin and D. Kahneman (Eds.) *Heuristic and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 397-420.

- Thayer, R. Newman, R. and McLain, T. (1994) "Self-Regulation of Mood: Strategies for Changing a Bad Mood, Raising Energy and Reducing Tension" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67 (5), 910-25.

- Thompson, S. and Hoggett, P. (2001), "The Emotional Dynamics of Deliberative Democracy" *Policy and Politics*, 29 (3), 351-364.

- Vygotsky, L. (1978) *Mind in Society*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- Weare, K. And Gray, G. (2003) *What works in Developing Children's Emotional and Social Competence and Well-being?* London: Department for Education and Skills.

- Weiner, B. (1985) "An Attributional Theory of Achievement, Motivation and Emotion" *Psychological Review*, 92, 549-573.

- Young, I.M. (1996) "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy" in S. Benhabib (Ed) *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 120-135.

- Young, I.M. (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Zeidner, M., Roberts, R.D. and Matthews, G. (2002) 'Can Emotional Intelligence be Schooled? A Critical Review', *Educational Psychologist*, 37, 215-231.