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Motivating Reflective Citizens: Deliberative Democracy and the Internal Deliberative Virtues

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1 Introduction

Deliberative democracy involves the consideration and justification of the various reasons on which we base political decisions.[1] It is a political framework by which citizens can discuss their beliefs and values and through deliberation find common ground on the important issues which they face as a community. Motivating citizens to reason deliberatively is, therefore, extremely important. Unless citizens want to engage with ideas and beliefs, and to use their cognitive skills wisely, there is little chance of this model of politics succeeding. In order to encourage engagement of this kind, deliberative democracy relies upon several virtues to encourage and guide the involvement of citizens.

There are two distinct types of virtue which are of value to the deliberative process. The first and most commonly discussed has to do with external deliberative virtues. They are virtues of deliberative speech, which regulate the deliberative process between individuals, and are primarily oriented toward other people. This type of virtue includes virtues such as publicity, accountability and reciprocity, each of which acts by making it procedurally unacceptable for citizens to speak with others in undesirable and essentially un-deliberative ways. It is hoped that such virtues will decrease instances where incompatible values seriously undermine agreement on moral and political issues.

[1] See Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); see also John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

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The second, and more neglected of the two types of virtues, has to do with internal deliberative virtues. Internal deliberative virtues are virtues of deliberative thought. They are employed in regulating the deliberative process within individuals and are primarily oriented toward the self. They include virtues like humility and hope and might be contrasted with, but also complement, external deliberative virtues. They are essential for motivating citizens to consciously employ their internal deliberative skills, such as deductive and metacognitive reasoning, so that they can interpret, understand and evaluate values and beliefs on a much deeper level than they otherwise would. This, in turn, enables them to make collective decisions and discover practical solutions to the problems that their community encounters.

Internal deliberative virtues do not receive the attention they deserve. Instead, their external counterparts tend to be the central motivational components of deliberative democratic accounts. The internal virtues such as hope, humility and fidelity have been sidelined and have not been given a role in modern society. In addition, other internal virtues like reflexivity also do not receive a sufficiently central role in deliberative democracy and are not held in the same esteem as the external virtues. Internal virtues could be used more effectively by deliberative theorists. They could be motivating individuals to think more effectively about the values and beliefs which they, and their fellow citizens, hold.

2 The Unmotivated Citizen and the Deliberative Response

The development of cognitive reasoning skills can achieve only so much for deliberative citizens. It is possible for citizens to possess such skills at advanced levels and still fail to use them. If citizens do not also possess a number of motivational virtues, they may not employ such skills in ways that serve democracy. Joseph Schumpeter believed that this was the problem with democracy. As Schumpeter notes, a typical citizen may possess a wide range of cognitive skills, but he "drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyses in a way that he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again."[2] Greater democratic participation should, therefore, be resisted according to Schumpeter, as a typical citizen lacks virtue in the democratic sphere. To place greater power into the hands of the general public would be dangerous not only to the health and success of the nation, but also to the prosperity and welfare of the general public.

Fernando Teson and Guido Pincione agree with Schumpeter that citizens often act without virtue in a democratic arena. However, they disagree with him over the main reason for their display of public ignorance. Schumpeter suggests that citizens become irrational upon entering the democratic arena. They succumb to their primal and passionate instincts. In contrast, Teson and Pincione identify the "high cost that citizens face to become acquainted with reliable social science—the public's

[2] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper Row, 1942), p. 262.

rational ignorance."[3] It takes too much time to become well informed on highly complex issues, and, as a consequence, there is little sense or rationale for doing otherwise. As a result, Teson and Pincione write, "citizens will be systematically mistaken in their beliefs about the social world, and no realistic amount of deliberation can put them right."[4] This, in turn, leads to what Teson and Pincione call "discourse failure," a situation in which politicians capitalize on a lack of motivation by citizens to be knowledgeable and informed.[5]

These criticisms of the democratic citizen provided by Schumpeter, and Teson and Pincione suggest a number of conclusions that are likely to undermine the aims of deliberative democracy. Citizens are largely self-interested creatures. They do not fully engage themselves with the perspectives of other citizens that require time and effort to understand. As well, citizens are often insensitive to the truth. They sometimes purposefully avoid information and perspectives that conflict with their own values. As a result, the democratic process can be undermined,because citizens are not be actively engaged in the collective pursuit of the best or fairest solutions to the problems that their society faces.[6] In addition, citizens often evaluate evidence in a biased way. Pronin, Puccio, and Ross suggest that there is already a "tendency for people to give greater weight to situational factors when assessing their own actions and outcomes than those of their peers."[7] This also undermines the collective search for fair and just policy solutions. Finally, according to some critics, citizens are also overconfident in many of the judgments that they make. It is common for citizens to believe that while they have "proceeded in a logical bottom-up manner, from the available facts to reasonable construals and beliefs, those who hold opposing beliefs have done just the opposite (i.e. they have proceeded in a top down fashion, from pre-existing motives and beliefs to biased interpretations)."[8] Citizens sometimes stick dogmatically to what they know rather than consider the interpretations of other people to learn new things from other people participating in deliberative arenas. All of this evidence points toward citizens who do not really consider, or deliberate about, new information. Ultimately, it suggests that some citizens lack many of the virtues required to employ cognitive skills in ways necessary for effective deliberative engagement.

The lack of internal deliberative virtues that citizens display should be of concern to all deliberative democrats. In modern liberal societies, individuals find themselves having to navigate their way through moral disagreement on levels never before experienced. There are many religions, ethnicities, ideologies, values,

[3] Fernando Teson and Guido Pincione, *Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation: A Theory of Discourse Failure* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 18.

[4] Ibid. 4.

[5] Ibid. 16–17.

[6] See Claus Offe, "How can we Trust our Fellow Citizens?" in Mark Warren, ed., *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 42–88; see also Gini Graham Scott, *The Truth about Lying* (Lincoln, Nebr.: Asja Press, 2006).

[7] Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio and Lee Ross, "Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspective" in Thomas Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. and D. Kahnemen, eds., *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 640.

[8] Ibid. 648.

and general worldviews. In a deliberative democratic society, people from diverse backgrounds who make collective decisions in a cognitively demanding environment require distinct virtues. They need the virtues so that they can decide what they believe before they enter deliberative arenas, what they believe during deliberative exchange, and how they might change their beliefs and identities as they are challenged and develop over time.

Deliberative theorists tend to rely on external deliberative virtues to try to achieve this. The virtues have to do with regulating the exchange of speech between citizens. They are expected to reduce the potential for antagonism between diverse groups and individuals by making certain ways of interacting unacceptable and by making other ways the accepted norm. External deliberative virtues encourage citizens to speak in ways that are not self-interested or insensitive to the truth. It is intended that they have the indirect effect of changing or moderating the preferences of citizens as the procedural constraints clash with their deeply held values and beliefs. In doing so, it is hoped that the external virtues will increase common ground between citizens and increase the chances of fair, just and mutually agreeable decisions being made.

Reciprocity is the external deliberative virtue that is most often proposed for such purposes in theories of deliberative democracy. In their virtue-centric account of deliberative democracy, Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson define reciprocity as the capacity to seek "reasons that can be justified to all parties who are motivated to find fair terms of social cooperation."[9] Its primary role as a virtue is to regulate public reason by limiting the kinds of reason that citizens can give in defense of the various claims that they make to each other, the requirement being that citizens should only make claims and provide reasons that they believe other people can accept in principle.

In *Political Liberalism*, John Rawls also endorses reciprocity as one of the central virtues necessary for reasonable deliberative citizens to discover fair terms of social cooperation. He suggests that it is a necessary that the citizens offering the terms "must reasonably think that those citizens to whom they are offered might also accept them….they must be able to do this as free and equal, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position."[10] In the accounts of Rawls and also Gutmann and Thompson, reciprocity primarily concerns the external exchange of speech between citizens. It rightly encourages citizens to talk in certain ways so that deliberation is less self-interested and more sensitive to the needs and values of all citizens involved.

The external deliberative virtue of publicity also plays a central role in most deliberative accounts. James Bohman makes a compelling argument for the importance of this virtue in modern deliberative societies. He suggests that the scope of political decision-making seems to have narrowed and that, in combating this, what he calls the logic of publicity has an essential role. By "the logic of publicity," he means the "political role it has in establishing the space for the

[9] Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 52.

[10] Rawls, op. cit., xlii.

exercise of citizenship, or more precisely its usefulness as a norm that solves social and political problems while maintaining the bases for cooperation and solidarity."[11] Henry Richardson also emphasizes the importance of this virtue in deliberative arenas in ensuring that "the individual intentions and beliefs that support public agreement [are] common knowledge among participants."[12] This makes it much more difficult for citizens to employ reasons that are self-interested or that lack reciprocity.

Reciprocity and publicity are also considered valuable in that they support other external virtues like accountability. Publicity, for example, ensures that the opinions and beliefs of citizens are available for scrutiny and criticism and ensures that individuals can be properly made to defend their positions and be responsible for them. As Gutmann and Thompson suggest, the virtue of accountability requires that "citizens and officials try to justify their decisions to all those who are bound by them, and some of those who are affected by them. This is the implication of the reason-giving process of deliberative democracy."[13] In playing this role, accountability is yet another central external virtue that is regularly endorsed, either explicitly or implicitly, in deliberative democratic accounts. It allows citizens to build up trust among each other and to create an environment where deliberative engagement can flourish.

There are also other external virtues that guide deliberative speech between citizens by encouraging them to talk and listen to others with respect. This includes virtues like civility and tolerance, both of which are important elements of numerous deliberative accounts. Toleration, as William Galston explains, implies "a principled refusal to use coercive state power to impose one's views on others, and therefore a commitment to moral competition through recruitment and persuasion alone."[14] As well, according to Peter Levine, civility can play an equally effective role, encouraging citizens to "challenge ideas strenuously without attacking people as individuals or as a member of a group."[15] It is generally argued that virtues like tolerance and civility can have a large impact on deliberation in society and can increase the chances that a diversity of opinions and perspectives can gain a hearing in deliberative arenas. However, while these external virtues make it difficult to remain self-interested and insensitive to different values in deliberative speech, they do not show how citizens actually think about political issues. They do not show how citizens develop or alter their values and beliefs so that they actually are less self-interested and more sensitive to the truth. Instead, external deliberative virtues allow us to organize self-interested and insensitive thoughts out of deliberative exchanges. In this respect, virtues like publicity and civility are helpful and important, but they do not

[11] James Bohman, "Citizenship and Norms of Publicity," *Political Theory*, vol. 27, no. 2, (1999), p. 176.

[12] Henry Richardson, "Democratic Intentions," in William Rehg and James Bohman, eds., *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), p. 365.

[13] Gutmann and Thompson, op. cit., p. 28.

[14] William Galston, *Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 126.

[15] Peter Levine, "Teaching and Learning Civility," *New Directions for Higher Education*, no. 152 (2010), p. 16.

offer a complete picture of the motivational requirements for an effective deliberative system.

It has been claimed that external virtues in deliberative democratic arenas can make matters worse. Chantal Mouffe suggests that an overreliance on virtues like reciprocity can exacerbate antagonisms or bury them, albeit temporarily, beneath a veneer of acceptable language.[16] Ultimately, this suggests that it is not enough to rely on external virtues alone. Although they are important, other virtues concerning the thoughts of individuals need also to be considered.

Theorists of deliberative democracy have generally paid little attention to internal deliberative virtues. There are occasional suggestions that citizens should be open-minded or reflective, which few deliberative democrats would deny in principle. However, there has been no account of the internal deliberative virtues required by citizens to motivate them to think deliberatively about the issues that affect their lives. No distinction has been made to identify the virtues of thought, and this may be a reason why they remain so neglected. Instead, there has been an overreliance on considering external deliberative virtues. Although deliberative democrats have neglected internal deliberative virtues, writers on critical thinking have examined their importance. Briefly considering how their approaches the issue is helpful in developing an account of internal deliberative virtues and how, in turn, citizens can deliberate effectively in society. Writers on critical thinking tend to approach the virtues or dispositions, as they are sometimes called, in two different ways. Some of them identify one overarching disposition, such as fair-mindedness or critical spirit, and then suggest many other sub-dispositions that are connected to the overarching disposition.[17] Other writers on critical thinking identify a number of dispositions that have equal standing and importance. The dispositions or virtues include flexibility, adventurousness, independence and open mindedness.[18] Generally, it is suggested that, if individuals are to be critical thinkers, they need to have as many such virtues as possible. The account of internal deliberative virtues we will consider is based on the first of these approaches.

3 Reflexivity

The internal virtue of reflexivity can help individuals. The original definition of "reflexivity" is that it is an almost instantaneous response often associated with mechanical and cybernetic reactions.[19] In this respect, it lies in direct opposition to the kind of deliberative and conscious decision making with which we are

[16] See Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

[17] See Richard Paul (1990) *Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Know to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World* (Sonoma, Calif.: Sonoma State University Press, 1990); see also Harvey Siegel's, *Educating Reason* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[18] See Robert Ennis, "A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities in Teaching Thinking Skills," in J. Boykoff Baron and R.J. Sternberg, eds., *Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice* (New York: Freeman, 1989), pp. 9–26.

[19] See Michael Lynch, "Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge Theory, " *Culture and Society*, vol. 17, no. 26, (2000), pp. 26–54.

concerned. The understanding of reflexivity with which we are concerned requires individuals to become more aware and more skeptical of the representation of natural and social knowledge in the world. This virtue can help citizens to question their own positions on issues and to examine critically the content of their values, policies, and political decisions. This understanding of reflexivity requires individuals to remain skeptical about the knowledge and information they encounter. It informs the individual and collective deliberative process as citizens try to determine what they believe and what the right course of action is. The virtue of reflexivity can play a central role in effecting choices that are made in society, which ultimately contribute toward shaping who we are as individuals and as a political community.

Reflexivity is related to the liberal tradition of romantic flourishing, exemplified in the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Henry Thoreau and John Stuart Mill. For Emerson, Thoreau, and Mill, "one must take responsibility for oneself- one's self must become a project, one must become the architect of one's soul. One's dignity resides in being to some important degree, a person of one's own creating, making, choosing rather than in being merely a creature or a socially manufactured, conditioned created thing."[20] They suggest that individuality and the opportunity for self-creation that it provides are the necessary conditions of human happiness. They hold that social progress could be empirically linked to the general increase of individuality in society. The critical reflection on the self, in order to improve ourselves, is similar to the virtue of reflexivity.

The value of the overarching disposition of reflexivity can be seen through its effects on the cognitive capacities of citizens. It influences how citizens inductively and deductively reason, remember things, and select techniques of deliberation. If citizens act reflexively, they are more likely to deliberate in a critically. Reflexivity can motivate them to look back on themselves, the reasons, memories, and techniques that they employ, with more scrutiny and awareness than they would otherwise show. Moreover, it can capture the epistemic character of the skills of mind and help citizens to understand why we use particular reasons or hold particular beliefs. This can help to foster deliberative citizens with the motivation to employ internal deliberative capacities on a consistent basis. Reflexivity is also valuable because it guides other dispositions that citizens require. There are classical, and equally neglected, internal virtues such as wisdom, temperance, and courage, for instance, which have a central role in ancient Greek philosophy. However, it is worth focusing on hope, humility and fidelity to reason because they are underexplored by writers on deliberative democracy, even as they can play an important role in deliberative society.

4 Hope as an Internal Virtue

According to some theorists, citizens remain ignorant and disengaged from democratic institutions because they are both rational and self-interested.[21]

[20] George Kateb, "Democratic Individuals and the Claims of Politics" *Political Theory*, vol. 12 (1984), p. 343.

[21] See Teson and Pincione, op. cit.

This understanding of normal human behavior lies in direct contrast to the assumptions and values of deliberative politics. It encourages citizens to think only of themselves and to disengage from the collective political process. However, from the deliberative perspective, it is not rational for citizens to remain uninformed about matters of politics and justice. Deliberative democrats assume that people have the capacity to be political and to be involved in decisions about the future of their society and that people can be more than self-interested. But the internal deliberative virtue of hope can play an important role in having citizens rise above self-interested political apathy and employ their internal deliberative skills to solve complex social problems.

It is odd that deliberative theorists have not drawn on the virtue of hope. It is possible that many of them share the view of Francis Bacon who compared hope to either a "soporific drug" that "induces sleep" within mankind or the source of constant disappointment given to our elevated levels of expectations.[22] Even so, hope has been discussed in a few modern accounts of liberal democracy, if not directly in relation to deliberative democracy. Ernst Bloch and Paulo Freire both discuss hope as an emancipatory virtue that can inspire people to overcome the constraints of capitalist society. In *The Principle of Hope*, Bloch claims that hope can already be seen in everyday consciousness and is reflected in various cultural forms ranging from great works of literature to operas and ballets.[23] In this respect, hope is a cultural phenomenon that finds its way from person to person through forms of art. For instance, when a movie like Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times* represents a negative aspect of capitalist society, it offers viewers an emancipatory moment in which they may hope for something better. However, what citizens do with the moments of hope is less clear when the political system is damaged and fails to represent particular emancipatory views. Nevertheless, hope constitutes an internal virtue for citizens in provoking a feeling that all is not lost and that they can use their skills to improve their lives.

Similarly, in *Pedagogy of Hope*, Freire views hope as a central feature of the emancipatory movement. He suggests that "to attempt to do without hope, which is based on the need for truth as an ethical quality of the struggle, is tantamount to denying that struggle one of its mainstays."[24] Instead of feeling helpless, children must be consciously transformed by teachers into adults who possess the hope to challenge the prevailing order and reinvent the world that they live in. Citizens, according to Freire, "must perceive their state not as fated and unalterable, but merely as limiting - and therefore challenging."[25] Hope should be deemed an essential virtue because it provokes citizens to imagine a better future for their societies and helps them to believe that progress is possible. It is a virtue of thought to nudge them out of inaction and despair toward a deliberative attitude. It encourages them to think of new ways of engaging with the values and beliefs of other citizens to improve their society.

[22] Francis Bacon, *History of Life and Death*. V (Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Publishing, 2003), p. 203.

[23] Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).

[24] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Hope* (New York: Continuum, 2004), p.

[25] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 66.

5 Fidelity to Reason

If hope can inspire citizens to use their cognitive skills, fidelity to reason can play a central role in motivating them to continue to use of their skills. The term "fidelity" can be traced back to the Latin word *fedelitas*, meaning faithfulness, and like hope it encourages a beneficial way of thinking for deliberative citizens by turning attitudes of individual citizens away from their selfish desires and more toward an ongoing concern for other people. It is useful to couple fidelity with reason, toward which it is increasingly important for deliberative citizens to be loyal. However, fidelity has not yet been successfully transformed in this way. Instead, much like hope, it remains underdeveloped in democratic theory. In philosophical discussions fidelity is often explored in relation to the keeping of promises and the fulfillment of contracts between citizens, and it is usually considered to be an external virtue. Hume and John Rawls both discuss the concept of fidelity in this way and suggest its importance in relation to maintaining the stability of society.[26] However, as an internal virtue, fidelity toward reason is aimed instead at ensuring that citizens do not abandon reason for dogmatism or a self-interested and irrational defense of their existing beliefs. As a regulative virtue, it helps citizens to arrive at their values and beliefs. It can play a role in undermining the motivational criticisms that people are self-interested and biased. Citizens with the internal virtue of fidelity to reason are more likely to deliberate internally through complex reasons than to rely on manipulated statistics, inaccurate stereotypes, or the negative labeling of other people. Furthermore, through developing this internal virtue, citizens are more likely to recognize when other individuals are not allied to reason.

6 Humility

As hope motivates citizens to begin internally deliberating about issues in society and fidelity to reason motivates citizens to use particular cognitive processes while deliberating about such issues, another virtue, humility, is needed to help citizens to change their minds about the beliefs and preferences that they already hold. Once we find errors in our judgment or better solutions to our problems, we need to be motivated to alter our opinions, and occasionally even our values. It must be acknowledged that there have been critical discussions of humility which have led to its omission from many political accounts. For instance, Hume asks "for what reason are [virtues like humility] everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve no manner or purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment?"[27] Similarly, Kant and Spinoza consider the humility that individuals display to each other as a

[26] See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1971), p. 344; see also William David Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930).

[27] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed., P. H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 270.

negative character trait with Spinoza suggesting that "humility is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our impotence or helplessness."[28] Friedrich Nietzsche derides humility as a tool of weak individuals to undermine stronger individuals, though he finds it useful as a virtue for weak individuals when he sarcastically compares humility to the actions of a worm, who when stepped upon curls up in a ball in order to protect itself from being stepped upon again.[29]

Inasmuch as humility has generally received a negative treatment from political philosophers, it is understandable that among deliberative democratic theorists there are few defenses of the virtue for citizens. However, it is possible to imagine a modern deliberative version of humility. Thomas Spraagens has suggested an account of humility that displays its characteristics in a more favorable light. Spraagens considers an "absence of dogmatism" in his account of liberal virtues when he suggests that a truly democratic citizen "recognizes and affirms that ultimately his or her beliefs about both moral truths and matters of empirical fact are just that: beliefs."[30] If citizens are to change their minds and not simply persist with their mistaken understandings of themselves or issues, they must have the capacity to be humble. They must have the ability to admit that they may in fact be wrong and that they may need to reconsider their position.

The virtue of humility is particularly needed because dogmatism and certainty remain common among individuals in society. Reliance on select authorities has often encouraged passive dogmatism and rigid belief systems among citizens, perhaps especially in the past. In contrast, citizens in modern liberal societies have contending putative experts professing a wide variety of truths about the world that they live in. In doing so, they offer an expert seal of approval, with the suggestion, perhaps, that their views do not need further deliberation or reconsideration. Alternatively, some putative experts adopt confused relativist positions, where all views are considered to be correct. The type of humility required for a deliberative society would avoid the extremes of passivity, certitude, and relativism. Humility requires that citizens listen to external sources, not only in the formulation of their views but when challenged to reconsider their positions, and if necessary encourages citizens to be willing to change their minds.

The strength of the virtue of humility is that it fosters critical thinking. Humility promotes this in a way that external virtues, like publicity and accountability, cannot. It requires citizens to be intrinsically motivated to change their beliefs if they are inconsistent, unfair, or unsupported by deliberative reasoning. Citizens with the virtue of humility would be less likely to suffer from the pervasive overconfidence that is common, while helping people to identify their self-interestedness and misplaced certitude. Humility is a valuable deliberative virtue, as deliberative democracy is built on the assumption that citizens are capable of changing and developing their beliefs

[28] Baruch Spinoza, *The Ethics,* trans. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1955), p. 178.

[29] See Friedrich Nietzsche, "Maxims and Arrows," *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kufmann (New York: Penguin, 1976), p. 471.

[30] Thomas Spraagens, *Civic Liberalism: Reflections On Our Democratic Ideals* (Boston: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 224.

and preferences over time. This can help them, from an internal perspective, to do so and find common ground between the core values which they and other citizens hold.

7 The Overarching Power of Internal Virtue

Inasmuch as the internal deliberative virtues of hope, fidelity and humility can play a valuable role in motivating deliberative citizens, they represent three key stages along the deliberative thought process that all citizens need to be effective deliberators. Other internal virtues might also be important alongside these virtues to fulfill other roles in the deliberative thought process. However, while all internal virtues are important, it is also important to recognize the overarching, positive role reflexivity can have. In some cases, the role may be small, reinforcing or overlapping with the motivation in question. In other cases, it may be substantial, helping to moderate an internal virtue that could otherwise be dangerous and counter-productive to the thought processes of citizens. The importance of reflexivity can be made clearer by considering how it might be related to hope, fidelity to reason, and humility.

Reflexivity can limit the dangers of excessive hope. Hope has been used in the past, by to placate citizens living in dire situations with fanciful promises about future gains. It may be used to maintain allegiance to values and belief structures that need replacing. Reflexivity can help to avoid this situation. It can temper hope through a realistic appraisal of a current situation, while promoting optimism. In practice, it can help to discourage government officials from making outrageous promises and playing on the hopes of its citizens. Although citizens may possess a spirit of hope for the future, reflexivity reduces naivety and the potential to be easily manipulated.

Reflexivity can also help us to direct the internal virtue of fidelity to integrate reason and its essential role for deliberative citizens. Reflexivity, as an overarching virtue, motivates individuals to reflect on their reasoning process and, therefore, plays a role in shaping fidelity toward reason. It motivates citizens to look back on their own reasoning process, and allows them to choose effective processes. The virtue of fidelity can motivate citizens to remain faithful toward effective deliberative processes instead of merely switching back and forth between processes that serve our self-interested needs in a deliberative process. Fidelity toward reason, therefore, can motivate citizens to avoid the self-interestedness that Teson and Pincione identified as the rational ignorance of democratic citizens.

Finally, the virtue of reflexivity also helps to limit the potentially negative effects of humility. It helps to address the fear that humility may encourage citizens to avoid speaking out against or challenging individuals in authority. Reflexivity encourages a critical attitude toward authority. It motivates citizens to reconsider their values and beliefs when their values and beliefs are actively called in to question. It makes it more likely that deliberative citizens can understand the nature of their mistakes, and less likely that they will make similar errors in the future.

In several respects, the effects of reflexivity can be seen as reinforcing particular virtues. However, the importance of reflexivity is that it is the virtue that should

always be present throughout the deliberative thought process for citizens. This is what makes it an overarching motivation that encourages citizens to employ and develop their cognitive skills effectively.[31]

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